China's real GDP has grown at an average annual rate of 10% for the last 30 years. A period of such super-growth is historically most unusual and now is likely nearing an end. The devices that have stimulated growth in the past -heavy capital investment and a massive focus on exports -face constraints: capital investment faces diminishing returns, and exports are undermined by wage inflation. Both constraints are visible in China today. China needs to stimulate domestic consumption of its prodigious output, but this is easier said than done. A push to do so will damage the export model well before it succeeds in building a replacement.
Introduction
Real GDP in China has grown at an average rate of nearly 10% annually for the 30 years from 1980 to 2010, exceeding the real growth of any other country over this period. This performance has been a source of amazement to academics and business people, and a source of immense pride to the Chinese. Certainly countries have grown rapidly in the past, but such growth has generally abated in time; 30 years is a very long run. As shown in Figure 1 , the growth has not been uniform. Rather, it has been concentrated in three bursts of 5-6 years duration, each associated with high growth in capital investment. I shall briefly explore the reasons for each of these high-growth periods.
The first growth phase was caused by the unleashing of Chinese entrepreneurship by Deng Xiao-Ping in the 1980s. In Huang's (2008) account, Deng put particular emphasis on the countryside via the Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) which were in fact private enterprises at the village level, and which benefited during the 1980s from significant financial support and political encouragement. This growth program brought benefits that were widely distributed around the country. Notably, it was not export-oriented.
By the early 1990s, the second growth phase, a new dynamic was in place. Political leadership shifted to a group of Shanghai-oriented politicians who emphasized investment in coastal areas that could produce export goods at the lowest possible prices, based on young labor imported from the inland provinces. This was initially based on producing labor-intensive goods such as clothing, shoes and toys. However, it soon evolved into a processing or assembly model that produced more sophisticated goods by importing components and assembling them based on cheap labor imported to the coast from the inland regions. TVEs were de-emphasized and dwindled as a source of growth.
During this period China benefited from another special factor: the offshore Chinese community including Hong Kong. As is well known, people of Chinese background have long dominated the business communities of Southeast Asia, owning a very large proportion of the private businesses in countries such as Thailand and Indonesia. Singapore was and is primarily p.3 a Chinese city-state. The offshore Chinese community was able to supply not only capital, but more importantly management skills and market access that China still lacked.
Hong Kong, which was under British rule until 1997, reverted to Chinese control in that year. Anticipation of the handover triggered major new opportunities for the wealthy entrepreneurs of Hong Kong to engage with mainland China. The export processing model was often implemented by a partnership between a factory on the Guangdong mainland and a "front office" in Hong Kong that handled management, marketing and finance.
As the export model matured in the early 2000s, a third factor produced a final growth spurt: for a number of reasons, credit to consumers in the United States and certain countries in Europe (notably the U.K., Ireland, Iceland and Spain) became much more freely available, particularly through mortgage markets. This led to a housing and stock market bubble, and wealth effects stimulated increased consumer spending in those countries. China was a substantial beneficiary of this increased spending, which stimulated the third growth episode illustrated in Figure 1 .
Many people take continuation of Chinese growth for granted; after all, China seemed to sustain high growth through the East Asian crisis of 1997-1999 and the financial collapse in the industrialized world in [2007] [2008] [2009] , when many other countries slowed or turned down. Yet growth should never be taken for granted: it does not happen by itself, but results from specific underlying changes and opportunities. Growth, by definition, is change; and change, by definition, is not permanent. It requires constant effort.
The Chinese government seems determined to sustain 8-12% growth for as long as possible. Yet the government itself acknowledges that this may not be feasible. Premier WenJiabao said this at the National People's Congress press conference in March, 2007: "The biggest problem with China's economy is that the growth is unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated and unsustainable". Japan offers the closest historical parallel to China's recent growth. Japan's real GDP grew at double-digit rates from the mid-1950s through the mid-1970s; many Western observers worried that Japan's disciplined workforce, work ethic, quality products and careful management would cause it to dominate the world economy, much as many Western observers today worry about China taking over the global economy. But after a spectacular 1973, Japan's growth began a long, gradual decline, as illustrated in Figure 2 . By the 1980s it was in the 5-7% range, but it was being artificially sustained by financial excesses: Japan's banks were massively overp.4 lending in this era, leading to inflation of equity and real estate prices, much as the subprime bubble artificially boosted U.S. growth in the 2000-2007 era. Japan's financial bubble burst in 1990, whereupon its GDP growth dropped to nearly zero.
There is ample reason to believe that China's growth is being artificially sustained by financial excesses at the present time. As will be discussed more fully below, its response to the industrial world recession of 2008-2010 has been over-lending by the Chinese banks, leading to substantial inflation of wages, equity values and real estate prices much as happened in Japan. The longer this continues, the more painful the comedown is likely to be.
The first section of this paper explores investment-driven growth, first in theory and then as it has worked in China. I explore diminishing returns, the efficiency of Chinese investment and particularly the concept that growth by investment can be value-destroying. The second section explores export-driven growth, first in theory and then as it has worked in China. China has enjoyed large-scale Ricardian benefits of trade due to globalization and the debt-driven consumption excesses in the United States and Europe during 2000-2007, but rising price and wage inflation will likely limit the export model's future.
The third section asks how readily China can shift from investment-and export-driven growth to a more sustainable model based on domestic consumption. This is the express goal of the government, but formidable obstacles stand in its way. Above all, the Chinese people are poor: the returns to capital in China have been high but the returns to labor have been extremely low. The low wages and famously high saving rate of the Chinese people feeds the investment and export models, but must change materially to support domestic consumption as an engine of growth. Indeed, China is now seeing some very large wage increases, and these must be sustained over many years to bring China's consumption levels closer to the norm in other countries. But the effort to build consumption by raising wages will undermine existing exports. The consequence may be a substantial pause in Chinese growth as one growth model is phased out and the other is phased in.
I. Investment-driven growth

Diminishing returns
China's fundamental growth strategy over 1980-2010 has China has grown primarily through heavy investment in capital plant over many decades.
In fact, gross fixed capital formation has increased steadily from 29% to 42% of GDP over 1980-2010, and many analysts have expressed concern that some of this rising tide of investment is inefficient. This fear seems particularly plausible since most of the investment is made by stateowned banks lending to state-owned companies. State-owned enterprises everywhere are prone to economic inefficiency because they serve political and social objectives in addition to purely economic ones. China, to its credit, has attempted to distance its state owned enterprises from direct political control, but this is not always successful.
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Investment efficiency
Increased capital investment does not by itself represent GDP growth: capital investment is a use of GDP, but whether it leads to future GDP growth depends entirely on how efficient the investment is. Capital investment only produces growth if it leads to greater production of products that can profitably be sold. Investment in infrastructure, for example, may briefly provide jobs but thereafter lead to no growth at all; Japan invested heavily in bridges, roads, tunnels and similar projects over 1991-2006 but this did not stimulate any significant economic growth.
A common measure of investment efficiency is the incremental capital/output ratio (ICOR), the ratio of new capital investment to growth in GDP. This can be computed in a number of ways. Figure 3 shows the ratio of average real capital investment over each year and the two preceding years, divided by the increment to real GDP in the current year. An ICOR of 3 or less is generally considered good, while an ICOR of 4-5 suggests inefficient investment. As shown in Figure 3 , China's ICOR was less than three only twice: in 1983-86
(the first growth phase) and again in 1992-95 (the second growth phase).
That is, one could say that the first and second growth phases were highly efficient, bringing important productivity gains. After 1994, however, growth gradually subsides and ICOR rises, i.e. diminishing returns begins to set in. As will be show below, a substantial portion of investment in the later 1990s proved to be value-destroying, leading to large losses in the Academics have examined investment efficiency in China using various methodologies.
Based on firm-level data from a sample of 12,400 firms in 120 cities in China, Dollar and Wei (2007) concluded that even after a quarter century of reforms state-owned firms still have significantly lower returns to capital than domestic private or foreign-owned firms. Based on aggregates at the provincial and national levels, He, Zhang and Shek (2007) found that the marginal product of capital has been relatively high for two decades and has not shown clear signs of decline, but this result was stronger in the coastal provinces than in the inland. They also found, however, that the rate of investment in China has consistently exceeded the share of capital income in GDP, implying that the rate of investment is too high and dynamically inefficient.
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Value creation and destruction
A related question is whether the capital investment creates or destroys value. Value is a financial concept, and finance has only a marginal role in classical macroeconomic models, which focus almost exclusively on the real economy. But value matters. If we could accurately estimate the future cash flows of all the firms in the economy and discount these to present value at an appropriate cost of capital, the result would be the value of the firms in the economy.
The rule in corporate finance is that new capital expenditure creates value if its return exceeds the cost of capital, but destroys value if its return is less than the cost of capital.
Value destruction may lie hidden for years and only gradually become apparent. Its eventual price is real, however, and is borne by the suppliers of capital. In a market-based financial system, capital suppliers sensing hidden value destruction first become nervous, then may rush for the exit, with prices of stocks, bonds, real estate and/or currencies suddenly falling.
The resulting crisis is painful, but the sharp pain signal typically calls attention to the underlying problem and usually brings the value destruction to an end. In some cases, however, the value destroyer is insulated from market signals.
A spectacular example of insulated value-destroying growth is provided by General The reason that GM's value-destroying growth of this magnitude did not trigger a flight by capital suppliers is that the company was insulated by its huge embedded cash flows. These cash flows might have been passed to the capital suppliers, who had opportunities to invest them at market rates of return, but instead were poured into capital investments whose poor quality was not visible for many years. Because embedded cash flows insulated the company from market pressures, GM did not generate investor anxiety for many decades.
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The East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 was as unexpected as was the recent crisis, and puzzled many observers because it was most severe in the countries that had been the most highly regarded and rapidly growing: Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines. Pomerleano (1998) conducted a study of firm-level accounting data to see if this growth had been value-destroying. Among other measures he examined a simple pre-tax return on capital employed (ROCE), dividing operating income by debt plus equity, and aggregating this year by year at the country level. He then compared his ROCE estimates to the local-currency interest rate year by year. His idea was that cost of capital is elusive, but is bounded below by the cost of debt: if a firm cannot earn at least the local currency interest rate on its total capital, it must be destroying value. Thus ROCE less local interest rate is a rough proxy for whether economic value was likely destroyed.
His results were striking: over 1992-96, the five years leading up to the East Asian crisis, this metric averaged -9% in Indonesia and Philippines, -8% in Thailand and -2% in Korea and was positive elsewhere in East Asia. This implies that firms for which accounting data were available were on average destroying value in four of the five countries that turned out to be the center of the East Asian crisis. This is one of the few metrics that in retrospect might have predicted the crisis.
In the case of China, the main capital suppliers are state-owned banks, which are unlikely to refuse lending to SOEs even if they destroy value. The banks are fully protected by the government and so do not suffer runs. Their patient behavior insulates Chinese firms, especially the SOEs, from capital flight. So China does not experience the pain signals that periodically shock other economies; this is the primary reason China did not appear to participate in either the East Asia crisis or the current financial crisis. But in a sense they did participate. If one has a decaying tooth, for example, the pain signal is unpleasant but forces attention to the underlying decay; the absence of a pain signal is not necessarily a benefit. The
East Asia crisis was a form of capital flight from countries whose economies had grown rapidly but which now seemed to have been destroying value. China participated in the value destruction (see next section) but avoided the capital flight.
Chinese banks and value losses
Banks in general are notorious for concealing value destruction. It is only when banks seek to be repaid that they learn whether the borrowers can repay with interest or not; if banks are willing to roll over their loans indefinitely, and lend more to ensure interest payments, losses Chinese companies with assets greater than $1 billion whose results are tabulated on Capital IQ. On average the metric is positive, though it declines from 6.2% to 3.4% over this period.
However, this averages some very large positives with a number of negatives. Over these five years the fraction of companies for which this metric is negative increases steadily from 26.8%
to 38.7%. It appears that more a third of these companies are not currently earning a return on capital employed greater than the local bank lending rate.
As noted above, China went through three great bursts of double-digit economic growth prior to the financial crisis, each of which was preceded and accompanied by a comparably large burst of capital investment facilitated by increased growth of domestic credit. Figure 4 illustrates the rapid growth of real domestic credit in China throughout the past 30 years. In fact, The chairman of China Construction Bank, the country's second largest by assets, has warned of the perils of rapid economic growth, adding his voice to a growing chorus of economists concerned about overheating. Gross domestic product growth of 9.5 per cent or above would "be very problematic", Guo Shuqing told the Financial Times. "It will mean more duplication of construction, more excess capacity and higher waste of capital."
The Chinese government's effort to protect the growth rate led to a further loan expansion of RMB 7.95 trillion in 2010, overshooting its target of RMB 7.50 trillion. Growth was at a 9.6% rate in the third quarter and is estimated to have exceeded 10% for all of 2010.
III. Export-driven growth
Why should exports be a source of economic growth? Exports, like investment, are not sources of output in themselves, they are uses of output. Why should it matter whether buyers of the output are domestic or foreign? It turns out to matter a great deal. Export competition brings a number of special benefits. Above all, it forces a country to compete with the best producers in the world, challenging the exporters to improve their products and processes as rapidly as possible. Furthermore, companies in industrialized countries are often interested in producing goods in low-wage economies for their markets, and are willing to invest in the low-wage countries to achieve this. The recipient country can extract a lot of benefits from this partnership including transfer of technology and modern management techniques. China has been particularly adept at extracting such benefits from foreign counterparts.
Chinese export experience
Researchers have studied in great detail the role of exports in Chinese growth. Clearly 
Rising wages
The export model has caused strains within China. A migrant population estimated at 130-170 million people left the rural Chinese hinterland and settled in burgeoning coastal cities.
The rural provinces, which benefited from Chinese growth in the 1980s, fell behind economically, and the migrants were little integrated into urban life. The social stress caused by the migration is a source of concern inside and outside the country. In 2010 a Taiwanese company (Foxconn) operating in Shenzhen experienced a highly-publicized wave of worker suicides, causing considerable agitation over working conditions in the export factories.
The reasons for labor agitation are many: the general unhappiness of displaced workers, the very low wages, the working conditions and, more recently, the inflation in The Chinese government could use its currency peg to moderate inflation if it chose to let the yuan rise more than it has, since a rising currency value would cool the export economy and make imports less expensive. However, this is not the preferred policy of the government, which tends to put growth in production above all other values. This channels the inflationary pressure into export prices directly.
China has in general been losing competitiveness. Figure 5 shows the BIS effective exchange rate for China. As can be seen, China lost competitiveness during the 1990s, then six years, and China ended 2010 with a 6% decline in its trade surplus.
p.14 The fundamental problem China faces is that rising wages will undermine the export model, which is based on being the lowest-cost supplier. Vietnam and others are ready to compete for that space as China's very success drives its wages higher. The model needs to change.
Could China simply move upscale into higher-end products, respected brands and more value-added? This is the way Japan managed its rising wages in the 1980s without slowing down. But Japan's success in moving upscale was actually limited to just a few industries, notably automobiles and electronics, where the existing competition was suffering quality and other problems. When Korea attempted to follow Japan's path a decade later it found the going much harder, primarily because Japanese products had become entrenched. Korea's automobiles, for example, have had a hard time establishing themselves in part because of Japan's earlier success in doing so: Korea cannot compete against Toyota as easily as Toyota competed against General Motors. China certainly has ambitions in electronics and automobiles, but only time will tell if they can move beyond cost advantages to compete on quality with the high-performance companies that tend to dominate these fields.
How much scope does China have for taking more low-end export market share away from other countries? The answer depends on what their appropriate longer-term market share ought to be, and how far they are from that optimum. This question was studied in detail by Bussière and Schnatz (2006) , who concluded that China's share of world trade was approximately at its appropriate longer-term level, given its size, location, development level and other factors:
China displays a higher degree of global trade integration than many other industrialised countries or Asian trading partners, However, our measure of global trade integration for China is not higher than that of several developed countries such as the US, Germany or Japan.
The implication is that China has already encroached substantially on the world's export markets, and trying to raise market share from this point will be an uphill battle. No doubt it will be tried, but there is a limit to the share that any competitor can achieve, so this may be at best a short-term strategy.
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IV. Domestic consumption-driven growth
China's mix of entrepreneurial energy, heavy investment and low-wage production for export has proven such a potent formula for economic growth that many people both inside the country and outside cannot imagine a China growing at less than 10% per year. But this is an illusion. The latest burst of capital investment financed by banks during 2009-2010 is almost surely generating another wave of NPLs in the banks.
This is not to say that Chinese growth must slow to a crawl as Japan's did after its bubble burst at the end of the 1980s, though this is one possible scenario. Unlike Japan, China has an untapped source of future economic growth: its consumers. From a broad perspective, We find a U-shaped pattern of savings over the life cycle, wherein the older and younger households have the highest savings rate. This is the opposite of the traditional "hump-shaped" profile of savings over the life cycle in the young workers save very little (in anticipation of rising income), savings rates tend to peak when income is the highest (middle age) and then fall off as workers approach retirement. This relationship between savings and age differs considerably from the norm in other countries.
Apparently younger Chinese are saving in anticipation of rising educational costs and older Chinese are saving in anticipation of rising health costs.
If Chinese consumers are to absorb a significantly larger fraction of consumer goods produced by Chinese factories, these precautionary savings rates would need to be brought down; this would require better state health care and more affordable education. The entire development philosophy would need to shift away from producers and toward consumers, with businesses raising wages, banks raising deposit rates and increasing consumer loans, government offering expanded health and education services.
While these are not impossible, they imply a major shift in behavior and expectations.
The Chinese leadership has often paid lip service to the goal of more internal consumption.
Having tilted so strongly toward producers, China needs to begin favoring consumers as a matter of good economics. But there is a timing problem: raising wages will impact export competitiveness immediately, but the benefits of wealthier consumers buying more may take many years to evolve. The old model must be disadvantaged well before the new model can take hold. That suggests an interim period of significantly slower growth. By far the best course would be to stimulate local consumption. This would imply rapidly rising wages and a return to positive real interest rates on deposits -no other program could stimulate local consumption as well. But the tradeoff would be an immediate reduction in the profits of banks and/or firms, at a time when both are beginning to face a new round of NPLs.
V. Summary and conclusion
Such a departure would surely be resisted by these powerful interests.
The Chinese leadership has a well-established pattern of gradualism, so any change in favor of workers and consumers is likely to move slowly, though it must surely come in due course. In the meantime, it seems more than likely that the golden age of Chinese supergrowth is nearing an end. No doubt China has a bright future, given the entrepreneurial energy p.18 of its people and the careful, pragmatic path taken by its government in economic policy. But China is at a crossroads. The old growth model has almost run its course, and a new one needs to be developed. The path needs to turn a corner to head in a new direction. Only time will tell how challenging this transition will be. Source: IMF International Financial Statistics, using GDP at 1995 prices and gross fixed capital formation adjusted to 1995 prices using the GDP deflator. Incremental capital averages the annual real gross fixed capital formation over three years, and this is divided by the increment to real GDP in the third year. Jan-94 Jan-96 Jan-98 Jan-00 Jan-02 Jan-04 Jan-06 Jan-08 Jan-10 Source: IMF International Financial Statistics. Annual bank rates were converted from nominal to real with the Consumer Price Index using 1+r = (1+R)/(1+π), where r is the real rate, R is the nominal annual rate and π is the change in CPI. 
